[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

nuclear weapons is now just as indispensable to Germany. Having renounced national
nuclear weapons, the Germans would be helpless in the face of a Warsaw Pact invasion
using nuclear arms without NATO tactical nuclear arms to back them up. To support
NATO, says the White Paper accordingly, the German Federal Government will continue
to support a efforts aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the Alliance, to include due
contribution to alleviating the defense burdens of the economically weaker allies.
Finally the White Paper points out the role of NATO as the  forward defense line
of the United States, arguing that the global balance of power and the relative equilibrium
in Europe depend upon NATO s effectiveness.  An expansion of the Soviet sphere of
influence to include western Europe would have a decisive impact upon the security of the
United States of America and its position as a world power. 207
On the subject of Germany s own commitment to NATO, the 1979 White Paper
praises the alliance as an effective peace-keeping instrument, a supranational defense
community of free nations who have managed to solve NATO s periodic problems with a
view to preserving its overall solidarity and security.  Solidarity in the Alliance does not
exclude differing points of view on specific questions. But it does call for unanimous
acknowledgment of the principle that the security of the individual is contingent upon the
security of the whole. It is the security interest of the whole which makes possible freedom
of action on the part of the individual while limiting it at the same time. 
The 1979 White Paper brings up the  troubled partnership question and the
consequent inclination of many observers to view internal NATO conflicts as more critical
than they actually are:
Ever since the Alliance has existed, it has had to cope with internal difficulty and tension.
The multifarious problems which arise from the continually changing global balance of power,
from the differing political and economic interests of the parties to the Alliance, and by no
means least from the growing financial burden, will continue to beset NATO.
To date the Alliance has settled its difficulties in a manner in keeping with the character of
a voluntary association of sovereign states. Mutual aid, mediation in disputes, and ever closer
consultation have been the helpful means to that end. There are no grounds to doubt that this
spirit of partnership will continue to determine the future of the Alliance.208
On the subject of détente the White Paper sees no inconsistency between the
furtherance of peaceful cooperation and the preservation of a strong NATO. Chancellor
Schmidt, it notes, made this point in a policy statement on June 1, 1978.  There is no
contradiction, he said,  between limiting armaments and strengthening the Western
Alliance, but an inherent logical association. It is a matter of complementary political goals;
the assurance of the military balance is an indispensable prerequisite for durable
détente. 209
The commitment to détente with the communist bloc: A succinct and
authoritative statement of this most crucial policy was given by Federal Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt in an address to the Bundestag on December 16, 1976 - after the conclusion of
the series of memorable treaties with Poland and East Germany and only six months
207
White Paper 1975/1976, pages #46-47.
208
White Paper 1979, pages #12-14.
209
Ibid.
- 77 -
before the neutron bomb controversy was to begin.
The German Federal Government, said Schmidt, had consistently pursued a policy of
permanent integration within the community of free western democracies - a principal aim
of West Germany since its formation. Détente is considered to be supplementary to that
policy - a way of establishing good neighborly relations with the East - just as the Federal
Republic also believes in a policy of  partnership based on equality with the nations of
the Third World.
However, warned Schmidt,  the steady increase of the Warsaw Pact s military
strength continues, in spite of the fact that the military potential of that group of states has
already reached a level far beyond that which is necessary for purely defensive
purposes. 210 Germany, he hoped, would be able to play an active part in European
disarmament efforts, particularly through the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions talks in
Vienna. On a worldwide basis, he continued, Germany would encourage greater [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

  • zanotowane.pl
  • doc.pisz.pl
  • pdf.pisz.pl
  • dona35.pev.pl