Dav

[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

approved rules governing the use of force. 26
In May 2007 Blackwater guards opened fire on the streets of Baghdad
twice in a single week. In once incident a guard shot and killed an Iraqi driver
near the Interior Ministry. In the other a Blackwater-protected convoy was
ambushed in downtown Baghdad, triggering a furious battle in which the con-
tractors, U.S. and Iraqi troops, and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters were fir-
ing in a congested area.27
On October 16, 2007, two men and a woman were wounded in a Kurdish
village in northern Iraq when guards from Erinys raked a crowded taxi with
142 SHADOW FORCE
automatic weapons fire. At that point it was the third shooting of Iraqi civilians
by a private security firm in the past month.28
In past years the normal standard operating procedure when a contractor was
thought to have done something wrong was to ship him or her home, sometimes
with the knowledge of U.S. officials. Blackwater, for example, terminated staff
for personnel problems under the WPPS II contract:
Termination of Blackwater Personnel
Weapons Related Incidents 28
Drugs and Alcohol Violations 25
Inappropriate/Lewd Conduct 16
Insubordination 11
Poor Performance 10
Aggressive/Violent Behavior 10
Rules Violations 8
Failure to Report an Incident/Lying 6
Publicly Embarrassing Blackwater 4
Security Clearance/Classification Issues 3
PTSD 1
Total 12229
This stands in sharp contrast to the procedure followed by regular military
forces. For example, the U.S. military has a commission that reviews damages
claims and makes payments when troops are determined to have erred in opening
fire on property or people. American troops suspected of shooting at Iraqis face
trial in military tribunals. They have actually been convicted for killing Iraqis,
something that has never happened with a security contractor.
Although PMC personnel have shot their weapons in hundreds of acknowl-
edged incidents, to date not a single contractor has been prosecuted. And most of the
private security companies in Iraq open fire far more frequently than has been pub-
licly acknowledged and rarely report such incidents to U.S. or Iraqi authorities.30
Either every single use of force has been beyond reproach or someone is
looking the other way. Given that we do not live in a perfect world, the latter
seems more likely. Thus, effective public accountability, despite the increase in
the number of new laws and regulations on the books that at least theoretically
apply to PMCs, is still lacking. Given that PMCs are here for the foreseeable
future, that situation cannot be allowed to continue.
Yet it is not clear that the U.S. government, which is, either directly or indi-
rectly, the major client of most PSCs in Iraq, has the best of intentions. Admittedly
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES 143
that sounds strange. Nowadays oversight and accountability, as well as prose-
cuting the guilty, are virtually sacred cows, right up there with patriotism, moth-
erhood, and apple pie. Who could possibly be against them?31
In a private briefing in mid-December 2007, Justice Department officials told
Congress they faced serious legal obstacles that might prevent any prosecution of
the Blackwater security guards involved in the September shooting in Baghdad
that left at least 17 Iraqis dead.
On January 24, 2008, U.S. government officials told Congress that the Bush
administration is not prepared to manage the contractors critical involvement in
the American war effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. At this point contractors had
been in both countries nearly five years. As of September 2007, there were more
than 196,000 contractor personnel working for the Pentagon in those countries.
But Jack Bell, deputy undersecretary of defense for logistics and materiel readi-
ness, testified before Congress on January 24 that they were not adequately pre-
pared to address what he termed this unprecedented scale of our dependence on
contractors.
Then, the New York Times reported on January 25 that the Bush administra-
tion will insist that the government in Baghdad guarantee civilian contractors spe-
cific legal protections from Iraqi law. This would be in lieu of a traditional
status-of-forces agreement, an accord that has historically been negotiated by the
executive branch and signed by the executive branch without a Senate vote. That
helped explain why on February 5 the Iraqi Cabinet approved a draft bill that
would subject foreign security contractors to Iraqi law, a position affirmed by
Samir Sumaidaie, Iraqi ambassador to the United States. He said the future of
PSCs is one of the prime concerns that the Iraqis will put on the table.
To really understand why concerns over control now loom so high, one needs
to go back to the weeks after the United States ceased major combat operations
in 2003. On June 27, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order 17,
Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF Iraq, Certain Missions and
Personnel in Iraq. 32 The order contained this language:
Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the
terms and conditions of their Contracts, . . .
Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed
by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract
thereto.
However, the order was never the blanket grant of immunity that its critics
claimed, since it also stated:
Notwithstanding any provisions in this Order, Private Security Companies and their
employees operating in Iraq must comply with all CPA Orders, Regulations, Memo-
randa, and any implementing instructions or regulations governing the existence and
144 SHADOW FORCE
activities of Private Security Companies in Iraq, including registration and licensing
of weapons and firearms.
Nothing in this provision shall prohibit MNF Personnel from preventing acts of seri-
ous misconduct by Contractors, or otherwise temporarily detaining any Contractors
who pose a risk of injury to themselves or others, pending expeditious turnover to the
appropriate authorities of the Sending State. In all such circumstances, the appropri- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

Tematy